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Reconsidering ³LPDJHPHWDSKRU´ in the light of perceptual simulation theory  
 
Elisabeth El Refaie 
 
Abstract 
³Image metaphor´ is defined in conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) as a mapping of visual 
structure from one entity onto another based on the mental images they evoke. It is 
considered an exceptional, one-off phenomenon that is most commonly found in literary 
discourses. However, according to perceptual simulation theory, all language, both literal and 
metaphorical, is understood partially by simulating in our minds what it would be like to 
actually perceive the things that are being described. These findings call into question the 
original distinction between image metaphors and the more prototypical correlation 
metaphors that have always been the focus of CMT. As I will argue in this article, there are 
nevertheless important differences regarding the detail, vividness and complexity of the 
mental imagery invited by these two types of metaphor. Since it is hard to consider 
visualization in the abstract, examples of pictorial equivalents of image metaphors will be 
used to support my argumentation. 
 
Introduction 
 
In conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), prototypical metaphors involve the mapping of rich 
knowledge and inferential structure from concrete, clearly structured experiences of our 
bodily actions and perceptions (e.g. journeys) onto more abstract domains (e.g. relationships). 
Such ³FRUUHODWLRQ´PHWDSKRUV*UDG\are seen to be deeply embedded in our basic 
reasoning and conventionalised in everyday language, typically generating clusters of related 
metaphorical expressions and idioms HJ³Our marriage is at a crossroads´³:H¶UHVWXFNLQ
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a rut´. Even the most illustrious instances of metaphors in literature and poetry, CMT 
claims, are often no more than creative extensions, elaborations, or combinations of these 
same entrenched thought patterns (Lakoff & Turner, 1989).  
According to Lakoff (1987), image metaphors represent a departure from this prototype, 
because they involve the mapping not of knowledge but of ³conventional mental images onto 
other conventional mental images by virtue of their internal structure´ (p. 219). This mapping 
can include part-whole structure, such as that between DSHUVRQ¶VIDFHDQGERG\RUDWWULEXWH 
structure, which involves basic visual characteristics such as colour, shape, and illumination 
(Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 90). For example, the line ³My wife«whose waist is an 
hourglass´ LQ$QGUp%UHWRQ¶V (1931/1984, p. 183) surrealist poem Free Union invites readers 
to map the image of an hourglass onto the image of a woman on the basis of their shared 
internal structure, with the middle section of the hourglass corresponding to the womaQ¶V
waist (cf. Lakoff, 1987, pp. 221-222). 'HVSLWHEHLQJ³YHU\FRPPRQ´(p. 219), particularly in 
literary discourses, image metaphors are thought to be IOHHWLQJ³RQH-VKRW´SKHQRPHQD, which 
are not central to the way we understand ourselves and the world we live in (p. 221).  
The notion of image metaphor has, over the years, received some critical attention from 
individual scholars (Caballero, 2001; 2003; Coëgnarts, & Kravanja, 2012; Crisp, 1996; 
Deignan, 2007; Gleason, 2009; Hamilton, 2004; Sweetser, 1995), yet the main focus of the 
CMT community has always been on the role played by correlation metaphors in our 
ordinary, everyday thinking and linguistic expression. As Gleason (2009, p. 438) notes, this 
KDVUHVXOWHGLQDQ³XQFHUWDLQIRRWLQJIRULPDJHPHWDSKRUV´ZLWKLQ&07&ULVSS
goes even further, arguing that the notion of image metaphor poses a serious challenge to 
anyone who is convinced of the conceptual nature of metaphor, while offering critics plenty 
of arguments to buttress their scepticism. It is certainly true that the emphasis on image 
PHWDSKRUV¶RQH-off, creative nature appears to align them more closely with traditional 
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literary theories of metaphor than with cognitive approaches, one of whose key tenets it is 
WKDW³>V@SHFLDOODQJXDJHH[SUHVVLQJVSHFLDOWKRXJKWLVDQH[SORLWDWLRQRIWKHFRPPRQDQGWR
EHDQDO\VHGRQO\LQUHVSHFWWRLW´7XUQHUS 
Perceptual simulation theory (PST), which is supported by a growing body of empirical 
evidence (Barsalou, 2008; Bergen, 2012; Gibbs, 2006; Ritchie, 2013), raises a new set of 
questions. According to PST, the processing of all language, whether literal or metaphorical, 
is accomplished through the partial simulation of associated bodily states, actions, and 
sensory perceptions: ³>:@e understand language by simulating in our minds what it would be 
OLNHWRH[SHULHQFHWKHWKLQJVWKDWWKHODQJXDJHGHVFULEHV´%HUJHQS. The concept 
hourglass, for example, might be represented in terms of the mental visual image of the 
REMHFW¶V general shape and of the sand trickling down, or the sensation of holding it and 
turning it over. :KHQZHKHDURUUHDGWKHZRUG³hourglass´VRPHRUDOORIWKHVHVLPXODWions 
become partially activated, using the same parts of the brain that are dedicated to perceiving 
and interacting with the real world. The nature and intensity of the simulations, and our 
conscious awareness of them, are shaped by the degree to which words are grounded in 
physical experience and by the context in which they are encountered. PST thus suggests that 
some degree of visualization is involved in the way the human mind organises and processes 
all language relating to things we are able to perceive with our eyes; it is certainly not unique 
to image metaphor.  
The aim of this article is to reassess the phenomenon of image metaphor in the light of 
these findings. As we have seen, /DNRII¶V definition of image metaphor rests on two key 
characteristics: its putative ability to evoke strong imagery for both the source and the target 
domain, and the one-off, strictly visual nature of the mappings that such pairings invite. 
These claims raise important questions:  
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1) Is the ability of metaphors to trigger mental imagery contingent upon the presence of 
two concrete conceptual domains? 
2) If not, is the mental imagery evoked by image metaphors quantitatively or 
qualitatively different from any visualization involved in the understanding of other 
kinds of metaphor? 
3) If image metaphors are really limited to the mapping of visual structure, why are they 
nevertheless apparently so common; what essential conceptual or communicative 
functions do they fulfil? 
 
I will address these three key questions in turn, drawing on theoretical arguments and 
empirical findings from both CMT and PST. My main argument in response to question one 
will be that mental imagery may be evoked by all kinds of metaphors, irrespective of whether 
only one or both of the domains are concrete. However, since correlation metaphors typically 
generate a lot of conventional expressions and idioms, they are only likely to evoke vivid 
visual simulations if they are encountered in contexts or genres that re-activate the embodied 
meanings on which the metaphors are based. Turning to the second question, I will argue that 
image metaphors draw attention to the visual properties of things, which means that they are 
likely to invite not just more conscious and deliberate, but also more complex, vivid, and 
detailed mental imagery than prototypical correlation metaphors. Indeed, some of these 
evoked images may be so complex that they exceed most SHRSOH¶VFDSDFLW\IRUYLVXDOL]DWLRQ
Because it is difficult to discuss mental imagery in the abstract, I will use pictorial 
equivalents of image metaphors IURP³JUDSKLFnarratives´ERRN-length stories in the comics 
format, to support my claims about the nature of the mental imagery invited by image 
metaphors.1 The third section starts by distinguishing between the main functions that 
metaphor is thought to fulfil within human thought and communication: to allow us to 
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understand abstract areas of life in terms of more concrete and embodied experiences; and to 
attract attention, change our perspective, and/or afford imaginative pleasure. While image 
metaphors have always been closely associated with the latter, more decorative function, I 
argue that they are also capable of shaping the way we think about and understand the world 
around us. This explains why they are found frequently in all kinds of literary and non-
literary, everyday discourses (cf. Caballero, 2001; Deignan, 2007; Sweetser, 1995). 
 
1. The role of visualization in the processing of correlation metaphors  
 
As mentioned above, PST scholars have discovered that all language about things we 
perceive with our eyes can trigger visual simulations. This finding has important implications 
for CMT scholars, because it challenges one of /DNRII¶VPDLQcriteria for distinguishing 
between image metaphors and prototypical correlation metaphors.  
According to PST, perceptual simulation occurs irrespective of whether language is used 
in a literal or nonliteral context, although there is some evidence that the simulations we 
construct in order to process metaphors are ³VOLJKWO\OHVVGHWDLOHGWKDQRQHVZHFRQVWUXFWIRU
OLWHUDOODQJXDJH´Bergen, 2012, p. 208), particularly when the metaphorical expressions used 
KDYHEHFRPHKLJKO\IDPLOLDUDQGFRQYHQWLRQDORYHUWLPH³,QRWKHUZRUGVRYHUWKHLUFDUHHUV
metaphorical expressions come to be less and less vivid, less vibrant, at least as measured by 
KRZPXFKWKH\GULYHPHWDSKRULFDOVLPXODWLRQV´SPerceptual simulations, which 
mostly take place without our conscious awareness, may be distinguished from the mental 
imagery we are able to conjure up intentionally, although the two forms of visualization are 
probably closely interrelated. It has been shown, for instance, that, when people are 
specifically asked to attend to the visual properties of a concept, the areas in the brain 
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responsible for such information become particularly active, which also indicates increased 
visual simulation (Barsalou, 2008, pp. 22-29). 
One notable difference between image metaphors and correlation metaphors is that the 
former connect two concrete objects, while in the case of the latter the target domain is 
typically more abstract, which, according to Gleason (2009, p. 441), normally correlates with 
³ORZLPDJHDELOLW\´ However, while concreteness and imageability are closely related, they 
are by no means co-extensive. In CMT, the concrete or abstract nature of a concept is 
determined by whether or not it refers to something we can perceive directly with our senses 
or experience through bodily actions (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). It is true that abstract 
concepts such as love, life, freedom, truth, and loyalty cannot be visualized at all without 
recourse to some form of metaphor, metonymy, or symbol. Yet some entities that are 
concrete according to the CMT definition also lack imageability, either because they are 
perceived by sensory organs other than the eye (e.g. smells, sounds, tastes), or because they 
can only be perceived indirectly through their effects on our bodies or objects in the world 
(e.g. forces such as gravity, wind, tides). Conversely, some things that would be considered 
abstract in CMT terms, in the sense that they are not accessible to our vision, can nevertheless 
be seen through the aid of technology and thus also pictured LQRXUPLQG¶VH\H (e.g. viruses, 
planets, internal bodily processes). Most of us are also able to form a clear mental image of 
entities that do not exist in the real world, including angels, demons, fairies, and hybrid 
objects and creatures of all kinds.  
It is nevertheless true that in the vast majority of correlation metaphors only the source 
domain is imageable, whereas image metaphors, by their very definition, consist of two 
imageable domains. There is no reason to assume that the presence of only one imageable 
domain, in itself, discourages visualization, but correlation metaphors are typically expressed 
through familiar expressions and idioms (Lakoff, 1987: 221), which, according to PST, 
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decreases the likelihood that they will trigger rich perceptual simulations. By contrast, 
metaphors that are based on the perception of physical resemblance, including image 
metaphors, tend to be a lot OHVVFRQVWUDLQHGVLQFHWKHKXPDQLPDJLQDWLRQ³LVERXQdless in its 
FDSDFLW\WRLPSRVHUHVHPEODQFHRQGLVSDUDWHREMHFWV´*UDG\SThey also tend to 
be expressed in more unconventional ± and thus visually evocative ± language than 
correlation metaphors.  
However, there is some empirical evidence that even verbal idioms that represent highly 
FRQYHQWLRQDOL]HGPDSSLQJVIURPDFRQFUHWHVRXUFHRQWRDPRUHDEVWUDFWWDUJHWVXFKDV³VSLOO
WKHEHDQV´DQG³KLWWKHFHLOLQJ´DUHDEOHWRWULJJHUUHPDUNDEO\FRQVLVWHQWPHQWDOLPDJHV
when people are explicitly asked WRGHVFULEHWKHLUYLVXDOL]DWLRQV*LEEV	2¶%ULHQ 
Another way of guiding people beyond the ³DXWRPDWLFDQGXQFRQVFLRXVHYHU\GD\XVH´ of 
conventional correlation metaphors (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 72) is by finding fresh, 
idiosyncratic extensions, elaborations or combinations, in the way that writers, poets and 
great rhetoricians are adept at doing. As Steen (1994) discovered in a series of experiments, 
readers typically also pay more attention to metaphors in literary than in non-literary texts, 
and this heightened attention increases the probability that the metaphors will generate rich 
ideas and fantasies. Even the most entrenched metaphorical expressions and idioms can also 
be (re-)activated by their immediate textual context, irrespective of the genre/register in 
which they occur (Goatly, 1997; Müller, 2008). For example, if a common metaphorical 
expression in a newspaper article is accompanied by an illustration or photograph that 
represents the source domain literally, readers may become more aware of the metaphorical 
nature of the expression. Similarly, if eyes and/or vision are mentioned explicitly in the 
vicinity of a particular poetic metaphor, the visual properties of the concepts that are being 
referred to are likely to be foregrounded in the UHDGHU¶VPLQG(Gleason, 2009, p. 445), thereby 
increasing the likelihood of vivid mental imagery.   
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A case in point is the example discussed by Kövecses (2011) of a journalist who was 
apparently inspired by the still visible devastation wreaked by Katrina in New Orleans to 
GHVFULEHWKHKXUULFDQHDVKDYLQJ³capsized´WKHOLIHRIRQHRIWKHFLW\¶VLQKDELWDQWVWKXV
H[WHQGLQJWKHJHQHUDOPHWDSKRURI³LIFE IS A JOURNEY´WRLQFOXGHWKHPRUHVSHFLILF
image of a sea journey that has ended in disaster (p. 64). This metaphorical expression may 
KDYHDOVRWULJJHUHGPHQWDOLPDJHU\LQVRPHRIWKHMRXUQDOLVW¶VDXGLHQFHSDUWLFXODUO\LIWKH\
had recently seen (pictures or film footage of) overturned boats in New Orleans.  
Even Lakoff & Turner (1989) concede that sometimes a source domain may create an 
image for an abstract target where none existed before. :KHQLQ%UHWRQ¶VFree Union, the 
ZLIH¶VWKRXJKWVDUHOLNHQHGWR³summer lightning´WKHDXWKRUVSURSRVHthe mapping is 
DFFRPSOLVKHGYLDWKHFRPPRQFRUUHODWLRQPHWDSKRU³UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING´
while also FUHDWLQJ³DQLPDJHRIDWKRXJKWDVDSDUWLFXODUO\SRZHUIXOOLJKWHQLQJEROW´p. 94). 
The description of a sudden powerfuOWKRXJKWDV³VXPPHUOLJKWHQLQJ´LVan unusual way of 
expressing the underlying mapping, thus perhaps DSSHDOLQJPRUHVWURQJO\WRSHRSOH¶VYLVXDO
imagination, especially when, as in this case, the metaphor is encountered in poetry. Gibbs & 
Bogdonovich (1999) included this line in their psycholinguistic study of how people interpret 
image metaphors in Free Union. Significantly, they do not mention any differences in terms 
of how this line was processed, compared to the genuine image metaphors in %UHWRQ¶V poem: 
In all cases, the participants were found to be more likely to draw on visual imagery than on 
general or relational knowledge of the source domain. 
Although some degree of visualization may thus be evoked by both image metaphors and 
correlation metaphors, my assertion is that in the case of the latter, detailed, vivid mental 
imagery is only likely to occur in particular genres and discourse contexts and/or when 
conventional mappings are extended, elaborated, or expressed in striking new language, 
although this would of course need to be tested empirically.  
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2. Mental imagery in the processing of image metaphors 
 
As we have seen, the ability to evoke mental imagery is not unique to image metaphors. 
However, this does not rule out the possibility that image metaphors may trigger a different 
type or quality of visualization.  
A key characteristic of image metaphors that distinguishes them both from correlation 
metaphors and other resemblance metaphors is that they often only make sense if we consider 
the visual properties of the two concepts. Writing before PST was developed, Tsur (1992) put 
forward the interesting theory that, when interpreting metaphor, there is a human preference 
for similarities based on what the two things do rather than what they are like in terms of their 
DHVWKHWLFSULQFLSOHV³For the purpose of survival, it is less important to know what an objects 
looks like than to know what it can do. This seems to be the reason for the cognitive tendency 
first to notice the functional elements in a figurative construction and only when this fails to 
account for the metaphor, to notice ± if at all ± WKHVHQVXRXVHOHPHQWV´ (p. 211). If the boy 
next door is described as a ball of fire, for example, people are more likely to think he is wild 
and energetic than that he is round and has red hair.  
A similar line of argumentation is developed by Ritchie (2013, pp. 95-105). Combining 
PST ZLWK6SHUEHUDQG:LOVRQ¶V (1995) relevance theory, he suggests that when a unit of 
language is encountered, a whole range of semantic connections and perceptual simulations 
are at least partially activated. In the search for relevance, some of these activations will be 
reduced or even suppressed entirely as completely irrelevant to the present cognitive context, 
whereas others are more highly activated. In the case of some metaphors, the perceptual 
VLPXODWLRQVPD\EHPRUHUHOHYDQWWKDQDQ\VHPDQWLFOLQNV³,QWKHH[WUHPHWKHVHPDQWLF
links associated with thHµOLWHUDO¶PHDQLQJRIZRUGVDQGSKUDVHVPD\EHXQLQWHUSUHWDEOHDQG
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meaningless, and accordingly be supressed, leaving only the more abstract schemas and 
VLPXODWLRQVLQGLUHFWO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHWDUJHW´S 
Accordingly, visual simulations are likely to be activated most strongly in the case of 
image metaphors that link together two domains of experience that have very little in 
common apart from their similar appearance. If, for example, a man is compared to a 
scarecrow, it is hard to find any significant actions or characteristics apart from the 
VFDUHFURZ¶VDSSHDUDQFHWKDWFRXOGSODXVLEO\EHPDSSHGRQWRWKHPDQZKLFKPHDQVWKDW
people are most likely to focus on visual aspects when processing this metaphor. We might 
thus expect a greater degree of activation of the visual system as people consciously search 
for a relevant interpretation of such metaphors.  
However, the fact that an image metaphor strongly invites visualization does not 
necessarily mean that everybody will actually process it in this way. /DNRII¶VRULJLQDO
description of image metaphor placed emphasis on the conventional nature of the mental 
LPDJHVHYRNHGE\ERWKWKHVRXUFHDQGWKHWDUJHWGRPDLQ³>7@KHLPDJHVWKDWLPDJH
metaphors apply to are conventional images - images that are acquired largely unconsciously 
and automatically over the years by members of a cultural community. For example, we all 
have a conventional image of an hourglass that we can call upon without being shown a 
particular hourglass or a picture oIRQH´S While it is true that most people in western 
industrialized nations are probably able to form at least a schematic mental image of a 
ZRPDQ¶VZDLVWDQGRIDQKRXUJODVVZLWKRXWPXFKFRQVFLRXVHIIRUWPDQ\RIWKHH[DPSOHVRI
image metaphors discussed by Lakoff (1987; 1993) and Lakoff and Turner (1989, pp. 90±99) 
DUHQRWLQIDFWEDVHGRQFRQYHQWLRQDOPHQWDOLPDJHV7KHYHU\QH[WOLQHLQ%UHWRQ¶VSRHP
IRULQVWDQFHOLNHQVWKHZLIH¶VZDLVWWR³the waist of an otter caught in the teeth of a tiger´,t 
is doubtful that many people would be able to call upon a conventional image of an otter 
10 
 
caught in the teeth of a tiger without at least some conscious effort, since it is not something 
we are likely to see regularly either in reality or in pictures.  
Moreover, there is an HQRUPRXVYDULDWLRQEHWZHHQLQGLYLGXDOV¶DELOLW\WRYLVXDOL]HWKLQJV
in vivid detail (Breitmeyer, 2010, p. 139). This ability is dependent on memory, which works 
by selecting, discarding, and reshaping elements of our experiences to fit our current 
interests. People with a detailed visual memory are likely to use their vision system more 
when processing language than people who rely more heavily on their motor or auditory 
system. Indeed, about three percent of the population claim that they do not generate any 
visual imagery at all, at least on the level of conscious awareness (Bergen, 2012, p. 152). 
There is also good evidence for variations in the degree to which people are object or spatial 
visualizers (p. 172), with some depending PRUHRQWKH³:KDWSDWKZD\´ZKLFK processes the 
detailed visual properties of objects, and others on WKH³:KHUHSDWKZD\,´which is 
responsible for processing information about the arrangements of objects and motion (pp. 51-
53).  
To make matters even more complicated, image metaphors require people not only to 
visualize the two domains, but also to mentally map one onto the other. This process, Lakoff 
(1987) submits, can be very straightforward, as when the mapping just involves a shared (e.g. 
hour-glass) form, or more complex, as in the tiger example, where the extent of the mapping 
³depends on the imagination of the reader: The writhing motion of the otter may be mapped 
RQWRWKHZLIH¶VERG\WKHGULSSLQJVKHHQRIWKHRWWHU¶VIXUPD\EHPDSSHGRQWRWKHZLIH¶V
shiny sweat´S 
But what visual processes does the ³mapping´ of properties from one mental image to 
another involve, exactly? The example of pictorial metaphors from graphic narratives may 
help us to explore this question in detail. Breitmeyer (2010, p. 145) is convinced that there is 
an intimate link between our ability to visualize things and the possibility of depicting them. 
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However, one important difference between verbal and visual manifestations of image 
metaphor is that, in the case of the former, the mapping of visual structure needs to be 
performed in the mind of individual readers/listeners, whereas in the latter case, the 
visualization has already been translated into a concrete picture by the image producer. 
Perhaps because of an innate talent, or because of years of paying close attention to shapes, 
colours and forms, visual artists are likely to be able to call upon a greater number of precise 
mental images than the average person and to use these to guide their visual representations: 
³Some of us might also be able to generate such imagery, but lack the skill to render them in 
any medium as art. Most of us, I must admit, simply do not have WKHPLQG¶VH\HRIDJRRG
DUWLVW´%UHLWPH\HUS 145). When an artist renders something in a visual form, he or 
she can thus be said to be doing some of the mental work for viewers, presenting them with 
imagery which may well exceed their individual capacity to visualize. 
The following extract from the graphic memoir The Spiral Cage, in which Al Davison 
(1990) relates his experiences of growing up with a severe form of spina bifida, may serve to 
illustrate one possible answer to the question of what the mental mapping of visual properties 
triggered by an image metaphor might look like. The two panels in fig. 1 form part of an 
HSLVRGHDERXWWKH\RXQJDGXOWSURWDJRQLVW¶VUHMHFWLRQE\DZRPDQZLWKZKRPKHKDVIDOOHQ
deeply in love. Standing alone by the bus stop on his way home from her house, battered by 
the wind and rain, he catches sight of a scarecrow in a field opposite. The way Al and the 
scarecrow are represented in the two consecutive panels suggests that they are alike, which, 
in turn, may evoke a metaphorical interpretation. 
 
< FIGURE REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS> 
Figure 1: Al Davison (1990) The spiral cage: An autobiography. London: Titan Books, no 
pagination.  
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In this type of visual metaphor, which has been termed variously a ³pictorial simile´ 
(Forceville, 1996) and ³V\PPHWULFimage (object) DOLJQPHQW´van Weelden et al., 2011; 
Schilperoord et al., 2009; Teng & Sun, 2002), entities belonging to two different conceptual 
domains are shown separately but in a way that emphasizes their similarity. Such metaphors 
often exploit a pre-existing resemblance between two entities, but the perception of 
resemblance may also be created by manipulating some of their attributes and/or arranging 
them in particular ways. 
Schilperood HWDOGUDZDKHOSIXOGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHHQWLWLHV¶³REMHFW-
FRQVWLWXWLYHDWWULEXWHV´VXFKDVVL]HVKDSHFRORXUDQGWH[WXUHDQGWKHLU³REMHFW-depictment 
DWWULEXWHV´ZKLFKFRQFHUQWKHZD\WKH\DUHGLVSOD\HGLQFOXGLQJWKHLUYLVXDOFRQWext, distance 
from the viewer, and alignment along a horizontal, vertical or diagonal axis. The authors 
UHODWHWKHVHDWWULEXWHVWR:HUWKHLPHU¶VGestalt principles of similarity and proximity, 
which are thought to guide the way we group perceptual elements in our environment 
together based on how similar they look or how close they are to each other. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the authors do not mention the Gestalt laws of symmetry, continuity, and 
common region, which also seem highly relevant to the discussion of object-depictment 
attributes. These principles suggest that items that are presented in a symmetrical order, 
continue a pattern or direction, or share a common background or bounded area tend to be 
regarded as belonging together (Zakia, 2002). In the two panels in fig. 2, for instance, the pre-
exiting similarities between Al and the scarecrow in terms of size and overall shape are 
underscored through the way they are depicted from the same angle and at almost the same 
distance from the viewer, with the different body parts being roughly aligned. The similar 
shape and closeness of the two panel frames, and the visual parallels and continued lines 
13 
 
formed by the flashes of lightening and the driving rain in the background of both pictures 
also underline the resemblance.  
If we apply these findings to the question of how people might process visual image 
metaphors, we may thus speculate that the two source domains are visualized as separate 
entities and then appraised for any visual correspondences between the two, in terms of either 
their part-whole structure or their visual properties. In some cases the shared properties are 
likely to be fairly straightforward, but other image metaphors draw parallels between objects 
that, on the face of it are not at all alike. In his study of metaphor in Imagist poetry, Gleason 
(2009, p. 444) discovered that image metaphor ³RIWHQSOD\VXSRQVLPLODULW\RIVKDSH´EXW
that there are also cases where physically dissimilar objects are compared (e.g. a coiled rope 
and a maple leaf). This, he believes, makes visualization much more challenging. Indeed, he 
is doubtful whether readers are ever really able to merge the two entities in their imagination. 
He cites the ambiguous figures invented by Gestalt psychologists in the first half of the 20th 
century, including the Necker cube and the duck-rabbit figure, which can be seen in two 
separate, incompatible ways, but only in one version at a time. The failure to fuse two images 
together in perceiving such ambiguous figures, Gleason suggests, PD\³KHOSPDUNWKHOLPLWV
RIWKHYLVXDOLPDJLQDWLRQ´LQWKHFDVHRILPDJHPHWDSKRUWRR³7KHFRJQLWLYHOHVVRQRI
ambiguous figures is that the terms of image metaphor, no matter how conceptually related or 
physically sLPLODUPXVWUHPDLQGLVWLQFWLQYLVXDOLPDJHU\´S 
The ambiguous figures in Gestalt psychology call to mind another possible way in which 
the notion of a mapping of visual structure in the processing of image metaphors might be 
translated into a pictorial form. In the following panel from Blankets&UDLJ7KRPVRQ¶V
(2003) semi-autobiographical account of his fundamentalist Christian upbringing in a small 
town in the American Midwest (fig. 2), metaphorical meaning emerges from what might be 
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termed a ³SHUFHSWXDO echo´(O5HIDLH, where one entity is depicted in a way that 
strongly calls to mind a different one.  
 
< FIGURE REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS> 
Figure 2: Craig Thompson (2003) Blankets. Marietta, GA: Top Shelf, p. 447.  
 
As a teenager, the protagonist falls in love with a beautiful girl, but his faith makes him 
reluctant to consummate the relationship. Given this context, most readers are likely to 
recognise that the snow drifts in figure 2 look remarkably like a naked womDQ¶VKLSVWKLJKV
and crotch, particularly as human beings have a natural tendency to see faces and bodies in 
clouds and other random forms and patterns in the world (Breitmeyer, 2010, p. 178). While it 
is perfectly possible that some people may construct such an ambiguous figure in their PLQG¶V
eye when interpreting WKHHTXLYDOHQWYHUEDOLPDJHPHWDSKRU³her body is snow drifts´, this 
would probably require a particularly finely tuned capacity for complex, detailed 
visualization.  
Kövecses (2002, p. 38) has described the process involved in the interpretation of image 
metaphors in slightly different terms, namely as WKH³VXSHULPSRVLWLRQRIRQHLPDJHRQWRWKH
RWKHU´. This suggests a mental image akin to what visual metaphor scholars FDOOD³K\EULG´
where target and source are visually amalgamated into one spatially bounded object 
(Forceville, 1996).2 The following scene (see fig.3), which is drawn from an earlier section of 
7KRPSVRQ¶VBlankets, contains a good example of a visual hybrid. Craig and his 
younger brother have been fighting, and the father punishes them by forcing the brother to 
sleep in the cubby hole under the stairs. In the eyes of the little boy, the folding bed takes on 
the features of a crocodile-like monster. This image speaks volumes about his terror at the 
prospect of spending the night alone in this dark, dusty, spider-infested place.  
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< FIGURE REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS> 
Figure 3: Craig Thompson (2003) Blankets. Marietta, GA: Top Shelf, p. 16.  
 
In order to interpret the equivalent verbal image metaphor (³the folding bed is a crocodile´, 
readers may indeed construct a unified hybrid figure similar to the one Thompson has 
created, but again the process would certainly require an extraordinary amount of conscious 
effort, as well as a detailed and accurate visual memory. Indeed, most people would probably 
find it challenging enough to picture even the most generic of crocodiles with any degree of 
precision, let alone to generate such a complex visual hybrid LQWKHLUPLQG¶VH\H 
In sum, because of their creative and unusual nature, and because they often only make 
sense if interpreted on the basis of a visual resemblance between two concepts, image 
metaphors typically invite more conscious, vivid, and complex visualizations than correlation 
metaphors. This process is likely to involve mental imagery that is akin to what visual 
metaphor theorist have described as symmetric image alignment, visual echoes, or hybrids. 
However, there are likely to be big differences with regard to how much individuals engage 
their visual system during language processing, and some image metaphors may well place 
excessive demands on many SHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WRperform the intricate visual processing task 
such metaphors invite. Clearly, these assumptions are still highly speculative and they would 
require rigorous empirical testing. 
 
3. The communicative functions of image metaphor 
 
In this final section I address the question why, if image metaphors are merely one-off 
mappings of visual structure with no essential conceptual function, they are nevertheless 
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apparently so common. Considering the many distinct approaches to the study of metaphor 
that have been developed since Antiquity, it is possible to distinguish very broadly between, 
on the one hand, views of metaphor as elaboration or adornment, and, on the other, metaphor 
as the very bedrock of human thought and language (Punter, 2007, p. 11). In the case of the 
former, the focus is on creative examples of verbal or visual metaphor in poetic or persuasive 
texts, whereas scholars in the latter tradition are most interested in those conventional, 
everyday metaphors that allow us to understand abstract areas of life in terms of more 
concrete and embodied experiences.  
The difficulty with these polarized views of metaphor is that there is a tendency for 
proponents of each side of the argument to downplay the relevance of instances of metaphor 
that do not quite fit into their own explanatory frameworks. Accordingly, there is a danger 
that the notion of image metaphor is misused by some as a dumping ground for all those 
cases that challenge or contradict the conceptual paradigm. This increases the temptation for 
CMT scholars to regard image metaphors as utterly distinct from prototypical correlation 
metaphors. In fact, as I will argue, there are many overlaps between the two types of 
metaphor and their respective communicative functions. Although image metaphors are often 
used for poetic purposes, they can also offer new insights by encouraging us to modify our 
understanding of two distinct conceptual domains as we consider one entity in terms of 
another. 
Lakoff and Turner (1989) concede that some image metaphors may trigger, reinforce, or 
interact with prototypical conceptual metaphors in complex ways. The image mapping of a 
tree onto a man, for instance, may activate the PHWDSKRU³PEOPLE ARE PLANTS´DQGWKXV
prompt the mapping of knowledge and inferences from one domain to the other (p. 92). Yet, 
DV&ULVSSSRLQWVRXWLQ&07³VXFKDQDFWLYDWLRQRIFRQFHSWXDOPHWDSKRUGRHV
QRWVHHPWREHDQHFHVVDU\EXWUDWKHUDQRSWLRQDOSURSHUW\RILPDJHPHWDSKRUV´ 
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If we consider again the examples discussed above, however, it seems that their 
meanings are not limited to the mapping of part-whole or visual attribute structure, at least 
when they are considered in their specific context of use. Even in the case of the image 
PHWDSKRU³her body is snow drifts´ where the main focus is on the shared shape of the two 
entities, the choice of snow rather than grassy slopes, for instance, is surely significant, 
suggesting something about how the deeply enamoured young man perceives the softness of 
KLVJLUOIULHQG¶V skin and the purity of his feelings for her. In all the other examples, the 
mapping of any visual properties just seems to act as a cue for the evocation of a whole range 
of shared meanings, although, again, many of these meanings are only activated by their 
specific narrative contexts. In the case of the metaphor ³the folding bed is a crocodile´, for 
instance, readers are invited to transfer not just the not just the share part-whole structure, but 
also ZKDWZHPLJKWLPDJLQHWKHOLWWOHER\¶VIHHOLQJVWRZDUGV crocodiles to be onto the bed. 
Similarly, $O¶VVHOI-identification with a scarecrow starts with a visual resemblance, but it 
also invites readers to project WKHVFDUHFURZ¶V lonely existence and immobility onto the young 
PDQ¶VIHHOLQJVRIGHMHFWLRQDQGDOLHQDWion from his own disabled body, for example.  
In fact, when examined more closely, even the most prototypical examples of poetic 
image metaphors discussed by Lakoff & Turner (1989) turn out not to be limited to the 
mapping of image structure, particularly if they are interpreted within the context of the 
whole poem. For example, Breton¶V FKRLFHRIDQKRXUJODVVWRGHVFULEHDZRPDQ¶VZDLVWmay 
have been PRWLYDWHGQRWRQO\E\WKLVREMHFW¶VVKDSHEXWDOVRE\WKHSHUFHSWXDOVLPXODWLRQV
and cultural connotations it is able to activate. We know from experience that an hourglass is 
typically fragile, and that it is often used to stand metonymically for transience, for instance. 
Both these meanings have a long history in Western consumer societies of being closely 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKZRPHQ¶VERGLHVDQGDUHWKXVOLNHO\WREHFRPHDFWLYDWHGLQWKHPLQGRIDW
least some of the readers processing this metaphor, especially after they have read the 
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IROORZLQJOLQHWKDWOLNHQVWKHZLIH¶VZDLVWWRWKDWRIDQRWWHUFDXJKWLQWKHWHHWKRIDWLJHU+DG
Breton chosen instead to describe her waist as an African djembe drum, our interpretation of 
the metaphor would probably be very different, even though this instrument is also hourglass-
shaped.  
When image metaphors are used in non-literary genres, they have also been found to 
convey meanings that go beyond the one-off mapping of image structure. In architectural 
discourses, for instance, they form the basis of a lot of conventional jargon and fulfil an 
important heuristic role in helping architects and commentators grasp the elusive conceptual 
domain of space. 7KHGHVFULSWLRQRIDEXLOGLQJDV³WDGSROH-OLNH´IRUH[DPSOHDOORZVSHRSle 
to understand and comment upon its different parts and how they are arranged to make up the 
whole (Caballero, 2001, p. 84).  IIDUFKLWHFWV¶VSHFLDOLVWNQRZOHGJHLVWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW
many of these image metaphors also carry important evaluative meaningV³2XUDELOLW\WR
understand what is both explicitly and implicitly conveyed verbally is only activated when 
metaphors are seen in context ± regardless of whether they map abstract knowledge or 
LPDJHV´&DEDOOHURSFRQFOXGHVIndeed, many cases of metaphor Caballero 
(2003) finds in her data are impossible to classify as pure image metaphors or pure 
conceptual metaphors. One example she gives is where the air-conditioning system in a 
EXLOGLQJLVGHVFULEHGLQWHUPVRIWKH³LQJHQLRXVweaving of ductwork LQFHLOLQJV´S, 
italics in the original). While reflecting the common conceptual metaphor 
³ARCHITECTURAL PRACTICE IS MAKING CLOTH,´ this metaphor also evokes a 
strong visual image that compares the arrangements of ducts in a building to the threads in a 
woven cloth.  
It seems, then, that /DNRII¶VDQG/DNRIIDQG7XUQHU¶V (1989) original distinction 
between the mappings involved in the cases of conventional conceptual metaphor and image 
metaphor might be over-simplistic, particularly if the discourse context and the possibility of 
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perceptual simulations and more connotative meanings are taken into account (cf. also 
Deignan, 2007). The pervasiveness of image metaphors in literary and non-literary discourses 
may thus be due to their ability to fulfil a broad range of communicative functions, including 
attracting our attention, providing imaginative pleasure, and encouraging us to change our 
understanding or evaluation of particular conceptual domains. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The main aim of this paper was to test the claims made by CMT about image metaphors by 
confronting them with the main findings of PST. This has led me to put forward several 
propositions about the role and nature of mental imagery in the processing of both correlation 
metaphors and image metaphors. I have suggested, for instance, that visualization is not an 
exclusive property of metaphors with two concrete or imageable domains, but that image 
metaphors typically invite a more deliberate, conscious, and detailed form of visualization 
than conventional correlation metaphors. The processing of image metaphors may take 
several different forms, all of which place high demands on thHLQGLYLGXDO¶VFDSDFLW\IRU
accurate and detailed visualization, which means that there is likely to be significant 
individual variation in terms of the way people actually interpret such metaphors. Finally, I 
made the point that, particularly when context is taken into account, image metaphors are 
able to fulfil a whole range of communicative and conceptual functions, including the ability 
to help us better understand and evaluate particular areas of life, and to afford a new 
perspective on the world, by eQFRXUDJLQJXVWR³ORRNDWWKHZRUOGDIUHVK´3XQWHUS
9). For this reason, metaphors based on visual resemblance are no less significant and 
influential to the way we perceive and understand the world than the correlation metaphors 
that have for so long been the almost exclusive focus of CMT. Although my claims are 
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consistent with the existing evidence, they do, of course, still need to be tested by rigorous 
empirical research.  
The tendency for CMT scholars to concentrate on the search for universal patterns of 
metaphorical understanding and to underplay the creative potential of many metaphors has, 
unfortunately, alienated many literary critics. As Biebuyck and Martens (2011) point out, 
literary metaphor, in particular, typically UHTXLUHVUHDGHUVWR³SD\FORVHDWWHQWLRQWRWKH
LQWHUDFWLRQLWVXVWDLQVZLWKRWKHUWURSHVDQGWRWKHQDUUDWLYHSRWHQWLDOWKDWWKXVHPHUJHV´S
7KLVHOLFLWV³DUHDGHUDWWLWXGHWKDWLVPRUHUHIOH[LYHPRUHFRRSHUDWLYHDQGOHVV
authoritative than the type of metaphor comprehension cognitive research describes, acting 
OHVVORFDOO\DQGKLQJLQJPRUHVWURQJO\RQG\QDPLFLQIHUHQFH´SA re-evaluation by 
CMT of image metaphors and of the many unique interpretations they are often able to invite 
may allow a rapprochement and enhanced collaboration between the two main traditions of 
metaphor study. I see my paper as a small step towards this goal.  
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1
 Although many work in this medium are replete with visual metaphors (El Refaie, 2012; 
Kukkonen, 2008), the phenomenon has, for the most part, been neglected by both metaphor 
and comics scholars. 
2
 $QDOWHUQDWLYHZD\RIDQDO\VLQJK\EULGYLVXDOPHWDSKRUVPLJKWEHLQWHUPVRI³FRQFHSWXDO
EOHQGV´)DXFRQQLHU	7XUQHU). However, a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses 
of Blending Theory exceeds the limited scope of the current article. For a critical review of 
this theory as an explanatory framework for metaphor, see Ritchie (2004). 
